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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPERFICIAL TREATMENT OF THIS CASE
IS A GRAVE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
This is not Robert DeBryfs case.
Jeff's case.

Nor is this Dayle

Nor is this Judge Bench's case.

No lawyer or

judge should have a false pride in winning the case; or in
losing the case; or in writing an opinion; or in changing an
opinion.

Presumably, the attorneys on both sides, as well as

the entire panel of judges, have a jo^nt goal of seeking justice .
This is Ralph Ostler's case.
his body -- from the waist down.

Ralph Ostler lost half

Hd deserves a thoughtful,

informed, reasoned analysis by each judge.
is not what he got.

Unfortunately, that

What Ralph Ostler got was a superficial

Opinion that did not even touch on the core issues.
spend his lifetime in a wheelchair.

Ralph will

Surely his case merits a

few extra hours of time by the judges.
Because of the superficial treatment of issues in this
case, Ostler has employed an expert to determine whether the
decision making process has broken dcbwn in this case.
experts opinion is attached as Exhibit |A.

The

Ostler's expert is chairperson of the Department of
Philosophy at the University of Utah.

Plaintiff's expert has

rated the quality of this Court's Opinion as a D or E grade.
This

is not intended

to criticize or embarrass

the Court.

Rather, this is an attempt to assist the Court from committing
a grave injustice.

Hopefully the Court will be inclined to

thank counsel, rather than to retaliate.
POINT II
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT
FAILED TO FOLLOW BINDING AND RECENT PRECEDENT
FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A major issue in the case was that Ostler's expert was
not permitted to testify on the "moth phenomenon."

The trial

court reasoned that such testimony was not admissible until a
foundation could be laid that father Ostler was awake just
prior to the accident.

(See Brief of Appellant at p. 6.)

This

court echoed the trial court's reasoning:
[T]he theory was premised on the fact that a
driver must be awake in order to be so "lured"
. . . without this foundation, the Court determined that the expert testimony would not be
helpful to the jury . . .
Slip Opinion, at p. 4.
However,

this

Court

overlooked

the

recent

case of

Huddleston v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed 2d 771
(1988) :
2

In determining whether the government has
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule
104(b), the trial court neitheJ: weighs credibility nor makes a finding thai the government
has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
The cjourt simply examines all the evidence and decides whether the
jury could reasonably find the conditional
fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Compare, Brief of Appellant at p. 6 & 7.)
In this case, there was abundant evidence from which
the jury could have concluded that fjather Ostler was awake.
(See, Brief of Appellant at p. 4 & 5.)

Contrary to Huddleston,

the trial court did not permit the evidence of the preliminary
fact issue to go to the jury.
the Huddleston analysis.

Nor did the trial court apply

(viz, whether the jury could reason-

ably find from the evidence that father Ostler was awake.)
This is not a matter of discretion.

Huddleston must be applied

to the facts of this case.
POINT III
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE +HIS COURT FAILED
TO FOLLOW BINDING RECENT PRECEDENT FROM
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
A second major issue in the <pase was that defendant
Wheeler had misstated the law in his (closing argument.
generally, Brief of Appellant at p. 33\)

(See

This Court's Opinion

holds that any error was cured by the fpllowinq comments of the
judge:
3

The jury is directed to look at the instructions. They set forth the law in that regard.
Statement of counsel is to be disregarded
except as it is accurate.
Slip Opinion, at p. 8.
However; this Court's Opinion was absolutely silent on
the issue of whether such a statement was sufficient to cure
the error.

Strangely, this Court's Opinion relies upon Halford

v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. App. 1977).

However, Halford,

squarely holds that such comments by the Court are not sufficient to cure the error.
More importantly, this Court's Opinion totally ignores
the recent Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Shickles, 760
P.2d 291 (Utah 1988).
p. 35 & 36.)

(See discussion at Brief of Appellant at

A proper application of the Shickles case should

have led to a reversal.
POINT IV
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT
HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THREE SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS
IN THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Ostler challenged the Court's instruction on independent intervening cause on four grounds:
define the term intervening

first, failure to

independent cause; second, that

foreseeability is only one test (not the sole test) to determine causation; third, that only a generalized risk of harm
4

need be foreseeable; and fourth, contusion.

(See generally,

Brief of Appellant at p. 56-58,)
This Court's Opinion deals onljy with the fourth issue:
viz. confusion-

Rehearing is necessary to analyze the other

three defects in the jury instructions J*
With respect to the fourth issue, this Court ruled that
the confusion was not "substantial or prejudicial".

In Harris

v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court reversed, in part, upon the confusion of an instruction on superceding cause.

It is obvious that the Utah

Supreme Court regards confusion regarding superceding cause to
be serious enough for reversal.
POINT V
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT'S OPINION
FAILED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF LIABILITY
There were two theories of liab p.lity:
First, that Wheeler was unlawfiil ly parked on the side
of the road in violation of §41-6-103(1 |)(i).

As this Court has

pointed out, that theory was conceded Ibv the defense, and the
1

It is true that the Court diet instruct the jury on
concurrent negligence. (Slip opinion p, 9.) However, concurrent negligence does not "fill the gap." The instruction on
concurrent negligence does not inform t{he jury of the dividing
line between concurrent cause and intervening cause.

5

Court directed a verdict on liability (but reserved on proximate cause).
The second theory of liability was that Wheeler was
parked on a controlled access highway for more than 10 minutes.
This theory was not conceded.
However, this Court has failed to appreciate that the
chain of causation is different depending upon which theory of
liability applies.

Thus, a truck parked for less than 10 min-

utes must simply turn on blinking lights.

But a truck parked

for more than 10 minutes must additionally put out flares or
triangles.

(See generally, Brief of Appellant

at p. 12.)

Ostler's expert exclaimed that flares and triangles offer an
additional measure of protection for the passing motorist and
that the accident could have been avoided if this additional
warning had been in place.

(Transcript, 232-233, 284.)

In

short, the absence of flares is an additional basis for proximate cause.

This Court's Opinion simply overlooked this

second theory of liability.
POINT VI
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT
HAS OVERLOOKED RESTATEMENT 442 AND 447
This Court glossed over the claim for a directed verdict by saying that it was a jury issue.
6

However, our Supreme

Court has adopted Section 442 of the Restatement^.

If this

Court also accepts Section 447 of the Restatement, there is no
jury issue.
deedf

The result must follow as a matter of logic.

In-

the illustration of Section 447 of the Restatement is

very similar to this case:
A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight
jolt might cause its heavy contents to fall
from it. He parks it in a street where to his
knowledge small boys congregate for play. Bf
one of the boysf tries to climb on the truck.
In so doingf he disturbs the load as he causes
a heavy article to fall upon and hurt C, a
comrade standing close by. Bfs act is not a
superseding cause of C's harm.
Reply Brief of Appellant at Appendix TWo.
To dispose of Ostler's motion for a directed verdict
without analyzing the interplay between Section 442 and 447 of
the Restatement is grossly superficial.

si

DATED this cyC/ day of _M^U>Wxy*S<-->

1989.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

2

Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d
(Utah 1983).
7
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EXHIBIT A

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RALPH OSTLER,

]

Plaintiff,

]I
•
]

vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
OF &R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E.WHEELER,

]
])
]

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

AFFldAVIT OF
PATRICIA HANNA

Case No.

88-00228-CA

'
)
)
)

My name is Patricia Hanna.

ss.

I give the following testimony under

oath:
1.

I hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati.

2. I am chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Utah.

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
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3. I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law. However, I am trained
in logic and argumentation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large
measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of analytic
reasoning. I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well
as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry. My
curriculum vita is attached.
4. I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read the Opinion of the
Utah Court of Appeals in Ostler v. Albina. et al. I have been asked to
render an opinion of that Opinion. Since I am not an attorney, I have not
been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong. Rather, I have
been asked to determine the extent to which the Opinion fairly analyzes
issues raised in the briefs.
5. I have read the briefs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts available for cross-checking.
6. In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course, I would have given it a
grade of 'D;' from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing
work.
7. In my opinion, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could
have been endorsed by three judges. Due to time pressures or
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they
deserved and required.
8.

My detailed analysis of the Court's Opinion follows:

Affidavit ot Patricia Hanna
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General Structure of Appeal
There is an underlying argument in the appeal which ties together 9
of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III,
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated. In
addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the
above mentioned 9 points.1 Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the
unifying argument, it is in my judgment impossible to appreciate its full
force.
In the very roughest terms, the underlying argument comes to this.
The case of Ralph Ostler (hereafter, Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler
(hereafter, Wheeler)ef al. cannot be resolved without a decision on the
issues of proximate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and
division of liability. In order for the jury to reach a reasoned conclusion
on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or
scientifically or factually based theories, and to be given a clear
presentation of the law as it bears on these ispues; in the absence of such
access, either the jury could not fulfill its responsibility or it should have
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only
to determine the extent of Wheeler's liability]
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated
nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the
plaintiff's case. Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no
appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a
bearing on more than one aspect of the case. This is most evident in the
case of negligence and proximate cause. While it might be understandable

1

The Appellate Court makes no ruling on this aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no
argumentation supporting its de facto denial of the appeal. This seems a significant omission
given that the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the
Reply Brief on pp. 45-48.

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
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that the trial judge, under the various time constraints and pressures
imposed by an on-going trial, might fail to appreciate this point, one
would suppose that the appeals process is in part intended to correct for
this by allowing three judges who have more time and distance to reflect
on the matter. This does not seem to have been the case; consequently, I
can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a serious
breakdown in the present case.
In what follows, I shall indicate how this argument is made and
sustained throughout the documentation presented to the Court of Appeals
on Ralph Ostler's behalf, and indicate how and where the Court of Appeals'
decision to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the
points raised by Ostler's counsel. I shall comment only on the 9 points
involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on these points.

Assumptions
There is no dispute on the following: Wheeler negligently parked his
semi-truck in the emergency lane on 1-15 between Santaquin and Payson,
Utah. He failed to set out flashers or triangles marking the presence of
his truck, and at @ 2:00 a.m. (P.S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter father
Ostler) pick-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran into
the back of Wheeler's truck. Throughout, I will take these as. given.
Point I
This contains the clearest statement of the general argument of the
appeal, and sets the stage for what follows. It is argued that although a
major portion of the trial revolved around the issue of proximate cause,
almost all of the evidence proffered by Ostler was rejected by the trial
court. As a result, when the trial court refused to direct a verdict against
Wheeler on the issue of causation, on the grounds that it is a matter of
fact which should properly be determined by the jury (Point XI), the jury
had seen none of the evidence which Ostler considered relevant this
decision.
In the absence of clear proof that this evidence lacked all merit,
this creates a serious problem for both procedural and substantive

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
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fairness. In rejecting Ostler's evidence, the trial court gives either no
indication that the reason for denying the jury access to the evidence was
that the evidence was entirely without merit.2 Instead, the evidence is
rejected on at least one of three grounds: 1. because it was held to be
irrelevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that
it would confuse the jurors, and 3. because it was felt that the jurors
already were fully aware of the phenomena. The aDDeal argues that these
grounds are all inadequate.3
1. The "moth-phenomenon". Wheeler's failure to use emergency devices.
and denial of presentation of 're-created' accident without truck in
emergency lane
The evidence related to the moth phenomenon consists in a theory,
which is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail-lights, whether
flashing or not, have a tendency to "lure" sleepy drivers towards them,
much as a moth is drawn to a light. Thus, if father Ostler was awake at
the time of the accident, Wheeler's tail-lights might have exerted this
"luring" effect on him, causing him to drive into the back of Wheeler's
truck.
In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triangles, Ostler
was not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testimony that had such
devices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided.
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the accident at the exact
location, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck
had not been present in the emergency lane, it was most likely that the
Ostler pick-up would have rolled unharmed into a field.

2

At one point counsel for the defense raises a question about the qualifications of Mr. Hulbert to
testify on the matter of the so-called "moth-phenomenon;" however, it is clear from the
transcript of the trial that any alleged lack of expertise had nothing to do with the trial judge's
decision to reject the evidence (Transcript of Trial, p. 245).
I have regrouped the sub-points under I according to their logical connections.

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
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In all three cases the evidence was rejected on the grounds that it
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether father
Ostler was awake or asleep.
Taking each point in isolation, might give
this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolation overlooks
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will be
explained below, and that Ostler also proposed introducing evidence to
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time
of the accident.
2.

Was father Ostler awake?

The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern
whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the appropriateness of the
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place emergency devices and the
pertinence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonable
to allow the jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter.
However, the trial court ruled that because the evidence was not decisive
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate.
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and interpretations of it to support his
claim that this ruling was based on a misinterpretation of the law. As a
legal layman, it seems to me that the case is this: Rule 104(b) says that
if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie support to a judgment
that something is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jury
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision. In the case at hand, the
trial court denied the jury access to the evidence on the grounds that the
evidence was not conclusive. It strikes me that if indeed this were the
standard, there would be precious little for a jury ever to deliberate; all
the evidence they would ever be given would be such that "no reasonable
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear
would be directed verdicts.
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic of
Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the Court of
Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal. What attention it
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does give falls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, saying
only that "Plaintiff's own expert admitted that there was no conclusive
way to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the
accident" (Opinion, p. 4). In light of Ostler's point, this statement is
simply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context.
3. Wheeler's violation of the 10-. 15- and 70- hour rules
Ostler attempted to introduce evidence showing that Wheeler was in
violation of several federal regulations governing interstate truck
drivers; in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that
Wheeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane. The
relevance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold. One, it contributes to his
negligence; the decision to rule it out because negligence was not
relevant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable.
However, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability.
Exhaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's
position and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would
affect whether and to what extent he should be held liable. Further, if
Wheeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and
needed to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an
attempt to stay awake, this would have a bearing on his culpability. The
Court of Appeals comments only that this (like all the other issues) "goes
to the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by
directed verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant. See Utah R. Evid. 402
("evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.")" (Opinion, p. 6).
4. The purpose of the emergency lane, foreseeabilitv of possibility of
such an incident in designing highways, and Wheeler's foreseen such a
possibility
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues
to show that, as an interstate truck driver. Wheeler was 1) aware of the
intended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless
there was a bona fide emergency because of Ijheir intended function (to
provide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within,
showing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
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occasionally leave the road surface and stray into the emergency lane),
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen.
Insofar as foreseeability is relevant to proximate cause, this
evidence clearly is related to that issue. It was disallowed on the grounds
that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were
"common knowledge." The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling.
This is a mistake on two grounds, 1) because it fails to take account of
the fact that one circumstance may relate to more than one issue,in this
case the circumstances are relevant both to negligence and to proximate
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common
knowledge.
Admissibility of this evidence
Ostler argues that all this evidence was relevant to the case and
should have been admitted. In order to see that this is so, one needs to
understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of Appeals in
order to support his contention that Wheeler was negligent, one of the
proximate causes of his injury and, therefore, liable.
This type of argument is called a constructive dilemma; it is a wellunderstood and valid form of argument.4
1. Either father Ostler was awake or asleep at the time of the
accident.
2. If he was awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a luring effect on
him, causing him to veer off the road; in the absence of flashers or
triangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the proximate causes of the
accident (father Ostler's driving itself being the other), and Wheeler is
therefore liable for the accident.

4

According to William Kneale and Martha Kneale. The Development of Logic (London: 1962),
dilemma has been recognized as a valid mode of argumentation since the second century A.D.,
when it appears in the writings of Hermogenes (p. 178).

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
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3. If, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, then while there
was no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane
without flashers or triangles still remains as one of the proximate causes
of the accident. Had the truck not been there, there would have been no
accident. Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes.
4. Therefore, regardless of whether father Ostler was awake or
asleep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the emergency lane stands as a
proximate cause of the accident, and consequently Wheeler is at least
partially liable for the accident.5
To argue that taken piece-by-piece the evidence would not be helpful
to the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it
prevented- Ostler's constructing this argument; further.to argue that each
piece of evidence is disallowed because it relates to negligence and
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrpw a view of the nature of
events. Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of
our lives. For example, the fact that the sky is blue is surely relevant
(pertains) to the artist trying to paint a landscape, but this does not make
it irrelevant to the astronomer trying to explain the nature of our
atmosphere and light's reaction to it. So too, the fact that all the
evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto render it
ineligible for consideration by the jury in connection with the issue of
proximate cause. This is especially so given the fact that the issue of
proximate cause was the key to the decision. The Court of Appeals'
decision shows absolutely no appreciation of this fact, and in no sense
addresses it. Indeed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion
clearly demonstrates this.

5

A similar argument can be constructed to show that whether father Ostler was awake or
asleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had the emergency
devices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running over the triangles would most
likely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; had he not been asleep, the devices would
have alerted him to the truck and allowed him to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the
accident would have been avoidable; therefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at the
time of the accident, the truck without emergency devices in place, is one of the proximate
causes of the accident.

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
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Further, in several instances the evidence was ruled out on the
grounds that the jury already knew everything being discussed; afterall,
they had driven of interstate highways, driven at night, etc. Ostler
presents strong evidence that under one, and perhaps the most relevant,
standard of admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge misapplied
the law and held Ostler's witnesses to too high a standard. The Court of
Appeals simply endorses the trial court's ruling, and had no discussion of
Ostler's arguments against this decision.
The common law standard allows expert testimony to be excluded if
it concerns information which in within the common knowledge of the
jury. Under this standard, since we all can understand the use of
emergency lanes (and no doubt at one time read a description of them) and
since we can understand the "moth phenomenon" and no doubt relate it to
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them.
However, under Rule 702 which supersedes the common law standard, this
requirement is relaxed. It is now no longer necessary to show that the
expert knows something that the jury doesn't know, all that is necessary
is that the expert be able to make the facts perspicuous to the jury and
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case.
Rule 702 states
If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added.)
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed if
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of
fact in understanding evidence that is simply
difficult [though] not beyond ordinary
understanding.
United States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd
Cir. 1985)
(Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18).
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In the case at hand, Ostler argues that the jury was fully capable of
understanding all the excluded evidence, but that it was essential to have
that evidence placed clearly before them. Specifically:
1) Members of
the jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not
entail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so
as to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might
think possible only for driver who was in fact asleep. 2) There is no
reason to suppose that the jurors knew about the different reactions
caused in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights, blinking tail-lights, and
flares; or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like
that at issue. 3) It is unclear that the average driver actually
understands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal
observation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not). 4)
Nor is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the
slightest idea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to
significantly higher standards than are ordinary drivers.
In the present case of most of the evidehce at hand, not only did the
jury need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is
overwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as
the higher common law standard requires). Not knowing these facts has a
clear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part,
and on a judgment of Wheeler's liability.
Yet the trial judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that
no expertise was needed to understand it. The Court of Appeals argues
that in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was
substantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial
judge's ruling. It is admitted by all parties th^t the trial judge has wide
discretion in such matters; and that to overrule the trial judge's decision
without exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of this
discretion.
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's
case it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend
the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's case.
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The Court of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could
take: each and every piece of evidence taken in isolation would by itself
make or break the case. However, as indicated above, Ostler's argument is
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument. In denying
Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell his side of the
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to
make an essentially comparative judgment.
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimum
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with
only one case available. In short, the jury was to make a comparative
ruling when the available alternatives consist of only one case (comparing
A to nothing). In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its
decision was whether Wheeler's story made sense; since they had no
alternative account of the situation, they could not compare that story
with another sensible story to see if one was a better account of what
happened. Having concluded that Wheeler's story was coherent, as it is,
the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler. If they had been.
allowed access to Ostler's evidence, in virtue of the form of the new
deliberation (comparing A to B, where A and B are two different
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a
failure to read the briefs carefully.
Point II and Point III
Restricted cross-examination of Wheeler concerning search for a place to
urinate
Wheeler's violation of federal regulations (10-. 15-. and 70- hour rules^
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment bv bad act
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony. The
trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant. Ostler's claim is
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that this is a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and
liability. The Court of Appeals offers nothing new on this, falling back
once again on the stand that if an issue is related to negligence, it is
appropriately excluded. There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals
appreciates this argument for the dual nature of the testimony.

Point IV
Misstatements during closing defendant's closing statement
In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the issue
was not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a driver might at some
time run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have
foreseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his
truck at just that time.
[T]he foreseeability question is: How was Stan
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that precise
time, if as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion chances
that it would happen right at that particular timequoted in Opinion, p. 8).
This clearly is not the standard to foreseeability; if it were, no one would
ever be able to foresee anything.
Ostler objected, and the only response 6f the trial judge was to
direct the juror's to their instructions. He did not rule on the objection,
clearly leaving the misstatement uncorrected . In some cases this might
have caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it
causes harm. The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to
the instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear,
complicated and difficult to understand. This will be discussed in more
detail under Point X below.
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together
with Point V. The Court of Appeals notes that the jury was directed to its
instructions, and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm.
This decision and the reasoning behind it reflects the Court of Appeals'
failure to take the misstatement and its correction in context, viz. the
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larger context of the legal issues involved in the jury's deliberations and
the fact that their instructions on these matters were unclear and
confusing.
Point V
Who Pays
This is related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading
statement made during closing. Here there is only an implication that the
defendants would have to pay out of their own pockets; hence it is less
clearly misleading than in the case of Point IV where the misinformation
was clearly stated. The Court of Appeals' ruling on this point seems well
taken; unfortunately because Point IV was treated in conjunction with
this, the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV.
Point VII
Jury given incorrect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares or
triangles
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C.C.
regulations requiring that they be set out were read to jury.
Whenever a vehicle is stopped upon the shoulder of
a highway from any cause other than necessary
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible,
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning
devices [flares or reflective triangles] (I.C.C. rule,
quoted in Appeal, p. 41).
Therefore, it is clear that Wheeler had a duty to set out the
devices. However, the jury was clearly instructed that this was not so.
Instead they were told that the regulations required that the devices be
set out only if the driver was parked for 10 minutes or longer QL, if parked
less than 10 minutes, depending on circumstances.
However if you find that defendant Wheeler was
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to
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determine whether or not Wheeler
should
nevertheless have set out the flares or triangles
under the existing circumstances (appeal p. 42).
This clearly states that whether a trucK driver has to set out the
emergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the
driver's judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, even
i i substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relates only to
negligence. Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal.
Ostler's point is that the I.C.C. regulation makes it clear that
truckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g.,
putting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the
judge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were
correct (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to
place emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the
actual rule clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary
drivers.
Further, it is not to the point to say that failure to set out warning
devices is related to negligence; of course it is. The point, once again, is
that it is also related to proximate cause; on that ground it should have
been stated clearly and correctly. It does not help the Court of Appeals'
judgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation
was stated correctly. In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply
left with two conflicting statements, both dealing with w highly relevant
matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict.

Point IX
Video tape demonstration
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide
the issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause. Since
these decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the
"cause" (Wheeler's truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not
been there, it is apparent that the jurors are asked to determine the truth
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of a counterfactual (a "contrary to the facts" or a "what if" case). The
idea is to see what was contributed to the situation by the negligent act;
one asks, "but for [the parked truck] what would have transpired?" or
"what if the truck hadn't been there; what would have happened then?"
Such determinations are notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to see
how a video showing a scene very much like what seems likely to have
obtained at the time of the accident, but without the truck in the
emergency lane, could have been anything but helpful.
The trial court disallowed the video on two grounds. First, that the
video did not meet the requirements of a re-enactment; it was not similar
enough to the incident to count as a re-enactment. Second, that it was
just "speculation" ( Opinion, p. 5), and as such would not help the jury.
The second is either misguided, or if not misguided then such as to
call for a through-going revision of legal standards. In deciding these
issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the
truck in fact not been there, there would be facts to consider, but then
there would be no case requiring a decision. If the reason for disallowing
the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the
determination itself, not the video, that is confusing.
Therefore, everything rests on the first ground; and this is in fact
the ground most discussed by the Court of Appeals. Here Ostler argues
that the standard of similarity applies only to re-enactments, where an
attempt is made to come as close as possible to duplicating the actual
accident. In such a case, similarity would be very relevant and should be
taken very seriously. However, this was not the intention in this case.
Here it is apparent and unargued that the video depicted a scene that could
llfli have occurred on the night father Ostler ran into Wheeler's truck; the
point of the video is illustrative, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on
the issue of proximate cause.
In ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals applied a three-prong
test: relevance, similarity and non-confusing. It decided that the video
failed the first two. It then considered the argument that the video was
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not a re-enactment, but an illustration; and upheld the trial court's ruling
on the ground that Ostler did not show that disallowing it did any harm or
that the trial court abused its discretion.
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point. The very nature
of decision of proximate cause and superseding intervening causes is by
its nature confusing. In view of the vast body of evidence already denied
the jury for its deliberations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim
that showing them the video would be confusing. At this stage of the trial
the video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making the point that
Wheeler's truck was not simply something for father Ostler's truck to hit
(as though he would have hit something else or rolled over if it hadn't been
there), but that but for Wheeler's truck there vyould have been no accident
of the sort that occurred. The video makes the point that Ostler's injuries
are not causally overdetermined,6 but that Wheeler's truck is a necessary
causal factor. Both the trial judge and the Cojurt of Appeals fail to see
this point.

Point X
Court's instructions on intervening causes was incorrect.
Ostler objected on several points:
1.

"Intervening independent cause" was unaeTinea.

2.

Foreseeability was not the only test of causation

3. Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to
be the standard of foreseeability.
4.

6

The instructions were confusing.

If something is causally overdetermined, it will occur whether or not one of the causes
occurs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleeping pills and after I take them you
fatally shoot me, we can say that my death was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting
constant, even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot
me, I die.
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The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as
given, that the contested instructions concern negligence and were
therefore harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof
that the instructions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion.
This decision one again fails to take account of dual nature of some
of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in which
the instructions were given and the evidence available to the jury. The
jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I). Taken in this context, Ostler's
case that it is overwhelmingly likely that the jury's ultimate decision
was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instructions
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals' reasoning indicates.
PQint XI
Directed verdict on causation
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked to
deliberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on which they were
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the
judge were unclear and confusing. In view of this it seems at least
unreasonable to ask the jury to reach a decision on the matter; however, in
the case at hand the error runs even deeper.
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds that
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a similar
verdict on causation. The defendant's response claims that if this were
allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and
causation; this is simply not so. Ostler argues only that in this case is
there an implication from negligence to causation; this does not imply
that there is such an implication in every case.
For example, I might park negligently with respect to the wild
animals in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running into
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked
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next to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plummeted over in any
case. The case at hand is not of this sort. He!re the negligence implies
causation. This is shown by asking what it was that made the act of
parking in the emergency lane negligent. The answer is two-fold: 1) risk
to a class of persons which included Ostler and 2) subjecting Ostler to
the hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60).
Thus, causation is implied by negligence.
The realization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's
driving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that injury. The standards cited
by Ostler clearly support this contention.7
Ostler goes on to argue that in this case the standard for a directed
verdict is met: reasonable minds cannot disagree. They cannot disagree
because the answer follows by definition from the earlier verdict. In the
Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 62, Ostler makes this clear: " The fact
that reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated
by the following question: What risks of harm (other than accidents with
passing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are
apparent."
Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree;
otherwise, we would all be A students in mathematics and logic. If we
are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even
though we are reasonable
The present case is of this unfortunate sort, me jurors were led to
draw the wrong conclusion not because it was an open question, but
because they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw
the correct conclusion. They were neither allowed to judge the issue of
causation as a simple matter of fact, because they were denied access the
relevant evidence (see Points I, II, III, VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to
them that as a matter of logic the case was closed.

7

The illustrative cases in Restatement of Torts. 2d, 442 A and B, 447 and 449 are especially
clear and illuminating on the issue at hand. (See Reply Brief, Appendix 3 and pp. 42-44.)
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for their decision to reject the appeal
are confusing.
First it is stated that generally proximate causation is
taken to be a determination of fact to be made by the jury. This may be
true in general; but Ostler has argued that it is not true in this case.
Moreover, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to
relevant evidence and could not make the determination. The Court of
Appeals' decision does not address this argument.
Second the Court of Appeals states that '"proximate cause' is one of
the essential elements of a negligence action" (Opinion, p. 10). This
implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence.
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason
for denying that appeal. It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals
makes this citation. What follows on p. 10 of the Opinion is equally
unmotivated. It seems correct, but neither adds to nor contradicts any of
Ostler's arguments or contentions. In short, the entire section on p. 10
stands as an enigma in the Court of Appeals' reasoning.
Conclusions
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude that in
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account
many important aspects of the arguments made in the appeal; at several
points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fails to
address the arguments made in the appeal. Due to time pressures or
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they
deserved and required.
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